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One held that psychological functions such as language
or memory could never be traced to a particular re-
gion of brain. If one had to accept, reluctantly, that
the brain did produce the mind, it did so as a whole
and not as a collection of parts with special functions.
The other camp held that, on the contrary, the brain
did have specialized parts and those pars generate sep-
arate mind functions.
Antonio R. Damasio .
Abstract
We present for mental processes the program of mathematical map-
ping which has been successfully realized for physical processes. We
emphasize that our project is not about mathematical simulation of
brain’s functioning as a complex physical system, i.e., mapping of
physical and chemical processes in the brain on mathematical spaces.
The project is about mapping of purely mental processes on mathe-
matical spaces. We present various arguments – philosophic, mathe-
matical, information, and neurophysiological – in favor of the p-adic
model of mental space. p-adic spaces have structures of hierarchic trees
and in our model such a tree hierarchy is considered as an image of
neuronal hierarchy. Hierarchic neural pathways are considered as fun-
damental units of information processing. As neural pathways can go
∗Supported in part by the EU Human Potential Programme, contact HPRN–CT–2002–
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through whole body, the mental space is produced by the whole neu-
ral system. Finally, we develop Probabilistic Neural Pathway Model
in that Mental States are represented by probability distributions on
mental space.
1 Introduction
In this paper (see also [1]-[10]) we present for mental processes the program
of mathematical mapping which has been successfully realized for physical
processes. Of course, this is the project of huge complexity and it would be
naive to expect to realize it in one paper or even in a series of papers. We
emphasize that our project is not about mathematical simulation of brain’s
functioning as a complex physical system, i.e., mapping of physical and chem-
ical processes in the brain on mathematical spaces. The project is about
mapping of purely mental processes on mathematical spaces. In particular,
the problem of the greatest importance is the creation of an adequate math-
ematical model of mental space. We agree that one can say that the project
was started two thousands years ago by famous Greek thinkers, Socrates,
Plato, Aristotle. So we can say that our paper returns us to the old question
of whether reality, either material or mental, may be fundamentally mathe-
matical. The question about material reality was answered in the positive.
The question about mental reality is still open. While harking back to Greek
thought on the possibly mathematical nature of mental reality, the project
is unusual from a contemporary point of view. These days, the more usual
role of mathematics lies in investigation of biological, chemical, and physical
bases of mental processes (even including the possibility of their quantum
origin). Our project shifts the focus to the mathematical modeling of pure
mental, rather than physical and chemical processes. It is hard to forsee
whether or not this strategy will be successful. Some form of our mathemat-
ical modeling may well prove effective in psychology, psychiatric treatment
and so forth. The crucial point is that we apply a new mathematics based on
so called p-adic numbers and it is too early to say whether it is adequate to
mental modeling. It is nevertheless possible that p-adics will open new paths
in mapping of mental processes on mathematical spaces. The main reason
for thinking that p-adics may be of value is that they appear better suited
than mathematics based on real or complex numbers to the heterogeneous
complexity and discontinuity of mental processes.
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If p is a prime number (and this case is the most interesting from the
mathematical viewpoint) then p-adic numbers, like real, form what mathe-
maticians term a ‘field.’ They can be added, subtracted, multiplied or divided
without leaving the set of p-adics (for any given p). This is the case with the
sets of rational and complex numbers too, but not with all infinite sets of
numbers. Integers, for example, do not form a ‘field’ since dividing one by
another can lead to a fraction outside the set of integers. In such a case
mathematicians use a term ‘ring.’ The set of p-adic numbers for non prime p
is not a field, but just a ring. Geometrically p-adic rings are represented by
hierarchic trees and this is one of the fundamental features of p-adics used
in mathematical modeling of mental processes. On p-adic trees there are de-
fined a p-adic metrics which are induced by the hierarchic structures of trees.
These are so called ultra-metrics. That p-adic spaces are metric spaces and
yet are different from ‘real’ metric spaces is crucial for our project. Their
metrics allow transfer of the mathematical machinery developed for ‘real’
spaces to weird-seeming spaces that are potentially better suited to describ-
ing mentality.
We recall the main steps in mathematical mapping of physical processes
and then we will discuss the possibility to apply this scheme to mental pro-
cesses.
2 Mapping of physical processes on mathe-
matical spaces
Step 1. Elaboration of the mathematical model of physical space.
At the first stage of development of physics (which at that time was not sep-
arated from philosophy) there was created a mathematical model of physical
space. This was the crucial step, because before to start the study of dynam-
ics of material systems we should have some space which “contains” these
systems.1 This stage of development took a few thousands years. First of
all it should be mentioned the great contribution of ancient Greek mathe-
maticians and philosophers. I would like to pay attention to the works of
Euclid and Aristotle. Everybody knows that the Euclidean geometric model
was the first axiomatic mathematical model of physical space. But not so
1Such a point of view was dominating in physics; in philosophy it was strongly sup-
ported by Kant.
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many people know about ideas of Aristotle on the structure of physical and
mental (!) spaces. We shall come back to Aristotle’s ideas on geometry of
mental space in section 4 and now we discuss only models of physical space.
It seems that he was the first who presented a detailed discussion on continu-
ity of physical space. For him physical space (in which material objects are
represented) is infinitely divisible and continuous in the sense that it can not
be represented as union of two parts which do not have common boundary.
These ideas were developed by Newton and (especially) Leibnitz and,
finally, there was created (through works of 19th century mathematicians
Cantor and Dedekind) the modern model of physical space - real continuum.
One dimensional continuum is geometrically represented by the straight line.
For further comparative analysis it is important to underline that the straight
line is an ordered set: for any two points x and y, we can say that x ≤ y or
y ≤ x. We also recall that continuum has the algebraic structure of the field
of real numbers.
We also should mention the great invention of Descartes who introduced
cartesian systems of coordinates in physical space. We present the well known
story about Descartes’ discovery of systems of coordinates. This story is not
just curious, but it would play an important role in the comparative analysis
of mapping of physical and mental processes on mathematical spaces.
Once Descartes stayed in a hotel and he occasionally looked through a window
and saw a tree in the garden nearby. There was a metal lattice on the window.
And that was the point! Descartes imagined the encoding of various parts of the
tree by using the lattice. He understood that by using lattices with smaller and
smaller cells one could create better and better encodings of the root, the trunk,
branches, and leaves of the tree.
Step 2. Dynamical equations. Material objects were mapped on
real continuum (to be more precise: on the cartesian product of three real
lines) and it became possible to describe motions of such objects in this
mathematical space.
Step 2a. Second Newton law. I. Newton formulated the fundamental
dynamical law:
m a s s × a c c e l e r a t i o n = f o r c e
Since the acceleration a = d
2x
dt2
(t), where x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), x3(t)) is the
trajectory of a physical system, this law can be written as a differential
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equation:
m
d2x
dt2
(t) = f(x), (1)
where m is the mass and f(x) is the force acting to a system. By fixing the
initial position and the velocity, x(0) = x0, v(0) =
dx
dt
(0) = v0, we determine
the trajectory x(t) as the unique solution of (1). Therefore Newtonian me-
chanics is a deterministic theory: if initial conditions are fixed the trajectory
is uniquely determined.
Step 2b. Hamiltonian equations. An important reformulation of
Newton’s mechanics is given by Hamiltonian formalism. Let us introduce
the momentum ξ = mv ≡ mdx
dt
and the energy
H(ξ, x) =
ξ2
2m
+ V (x),
here HKin =
ξ2
2m
and Hpotential = V (x) are kinetic and potential energies. A
force f is said to be potential if f(x) = −dV
dx
(x). For potential forces f, the
Newton equation (1) can be rewritten in the form
dx
dt
=
∂H
∂ξ
,
dξ
dt
= −
∂H
∂x
(2)
The first equation is just the definition of the momentum ξ and the second
coincides with (1). The system (2) of Hamiltonian equations with initial
conditions x(0) = x0, ξ(0) = ξ0 determines uniquely the trajectory (x(t), ξ(t))
in the so called phase space - the cartesian product of 3 + 3 real lines. This
is the classical phase space dynamics.
Step 3: Statistical mechanics. Consider millions of particles which
motions are described by the Newton (or Hamiltonian) equations. Existence
of such a model is extremely important from the philosophic viewpoint, but
this deterministic model is not so useful for applications. It is meaningless
to describe mathematically millions trajectories. Moreover, by investigating
individual trajectories we cannot find some “collective characteristics” of an
ensemble of particles such as, e.g., energy, temperature. In this situation
it is natural to describe statistical behavior of ensembles of particles. Let
us consider the simultaneous probability distribution of particles’ position x
and momentum ξ, and denote the density of this probability distribution by
ρ(x, ξ). Thus the probability to find a particle in a domain O of the phase
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space can be calculated as
P((x, ξ) ∈ O) =
∫ ∫
O
ρ(x, ξ)dxdξ,
By using the Hamiltonian equations it is easy to derive the evolution equation
for the density ρ. This is the Liouville equation:
∂ρ
∂t
= {ρ,H}, (3)
where {ρ,H} is the Poisson bracket of functions ρ and H :
{ρ,H} =
∂ρ
∂x
∂H
∂ξ
−
∂ρ
∂ξ
∂H
∂x
.
The probability distribution P on the phase-space is the basic object of
statistical physics. One can forget about behavior of individual systems and
investigate only probabilities.
Step 4. Stochastic processes, Brownian motion, diffusion. Let
us consider the motion of a Brownian particle. The trajectory of such a
particle can be extremely irregular. Almost all trajectories are not smooth.
Thus the basic tool of Newtonian mechanics – differentials – becomes totally
meaningless. It is impossible to apply the Newton (or Hamiltonian) equation
to describe the dynamic of a particle. However, there were developed new
mathematical methods based on stochastic differential equations which give
the possibility to describe dynamics of Brownian-like systems:
dx(t, ω) = a(x(t, ω))dt+ b(x(t, ω))dω(t), (4)
where dt is the ordinary differential and dw(t, ω) is the Ito differential –
an “infinitesimal element of the Brownian process.” Here the parameter
ω describes “chance.” It is natural to consider ω as the label for a particle:
x(t, ω) is the trajectory of the particle ω. This stochastic differential equation
completed by the initial condition x(0, ω) = x0(ω) describes the dynamics
of a particle ω. At the first sight there is no difference with deterministic
Newtonian mechanics. But, in fact, the difference is very large. The crucial
point is that a solution of a stochastic differential equation is unique (again
for Lipschitz coefficients) only up to stochastic equivalence. We recall that
two stochastic processes x(t, ω) and y(t, ω) are stochastically equivalent if for
any t :
P(Ωt) = 0, where Ωt = {ω : x(t, ω) 6= y(t, ω)}. (5)
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Two solutions x(t, ω) and y(t, ω) of the same stochastic differential equation
(with the same initial condition) can be different, but only with probability
zero (so for negligibly small number of particles). However, these negligi-
bly small sets of particles Ωt depend on t. Thus, for a time interval [0, δ],
solutions can be essentially different. Therefore in theory of stochastic dif-
ferential equations people are interested not in individual solutions, but in
corresponding probability distribution P(t, U) = P(ω : x(t, ω) ∈ U). This
is the probability that at the instant of time t a particle ω belongs to a do-
main U of physical space. The density of this probability distribution p(t, x)
satisfies the Kolmogorov’s forward equation2:
∂p
∂t
(t, x) = Lp(t, x), lim
t↓0
p(t, x) = p0(x), (6)
Here L is the generator of the evolution of probability distributions. We
consider a particular class of generators L which in the one dimensional case
have the form:
Lp(x) =
1
2
d2
dx2
[b2(x)p(x)]−
d
dx
[a(x)p(x)].
The corresponding Kolmogorov’s forward equation (6) describes diffusion and
the corresponding stochastic differential equation is called diffusion equa-
tion.3 In particular, if b = 1 and a = 0, i.e. L = 1
2
d2
dx2
, the equation (6)
describes the evolution of the probability distribution for Brownian motion
(Wiener process).
Step 5: Quantum physics We shall not consider quantum models
in this paper, see, e.g., [10] and the extended bibliography in that paper.
Quantum mechanics is also a statistical theory: all quantum experiments are
about statistical behavior of huge ensembles of quantum particles. However,
in the opposition of classical statistical physics, it is assumed (at least by
those who use the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation) that quantum prob-
abilities cannot be reduced to ordinary ensemble probabilities. Thus there
is no any deterministic prequantum process – neither deterministic (as in
2This equation is known to physicists as the Fokker-Planck (or continuity equation).
3The coefficients a(x) and b2(x) are called drift and diffusion coefficients. By neglecting
inertia of a particle it can be assumed that its motion consists of two components: drift
induced by macroscopic velocity of flow of liquid and fluctuations induced by chaotic
motion of molecules of liquid.
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classical statistical physics) nor stochastic (such as the diffusion process) –
which could generate quantum probabilistic distributions.4
3 Mapping of mental processes on mathemat-
ical spaces
We repeat for mental processes the scheme of mapping on mathematical
spaces which has been successfully realized in physics:
Step 1: Elaboration of the notion of mental space. We should find
an adequate mathematical model of mental space M. Points of M (mental
points) will represent elementary mental states.
Step 2: Dynamical equations in mental space. There should be pre-
sented dynamical equations describing trajectories x(t) of elementary states
in the mental space M.
Step 3: Mental statistical dynamics. In the same way as in classi-
cal statistical physics it is natural to study not behavior of individual states
(millions of trajectories in M), but probabilistic behavior of huge statistical
ensembles of elementary states. And this is not just the question of sim-
plification of the mathematical description. There are numerous evidences
that the mind is the product of the activity of the whole brain, see, e.g.,
[11]-[13]. Thus mind should be produced by ensembles and not individual
states. Later we shall present some neurophysiological arguments in favor
of “ensemble-mind.” At the moment we present a general argument from
information theory. This is the argument of security of processing of infor-
mation. For an information system producing millions of states it would be
very dangerous to realize functions of large importance by operating with
individual states. There should be developed the ability to take “collective
decisions.” Probability is the fundamental factor determining such decisions.
On the other hand, we can not exclude that some simple mental functions
can be realized through dynamics of individual states.
Step 4. Mental diffusion. As we know from physics, classical statis-
tical mechanics is still deterministic. There is the perfect mechanical order
described by the Newton (or Hamilton) equations. Trajectories are smooth
4Of course, there are some attempts to construct such processes, e.g., Bohmian me-
chanics (deterministic prequantum process), or stochastic electrodynamics (prequantum
stochastic process).
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and particles do not perform actions violating Newtonian order! Intuitively
the mental dynamics does not look so well ordered as the Newtonian dynam-
ics. It may be more natural to consider in mental space M the stochastic
dynamics, instead of the deterministic dynamics. Later we shall present a
neurophysiological argument supporting the stochastic dynamical model (in
mental space!).
We emphasize that by choosing the stochastic mental dynamics, instead
of the Newtonian mental dynamics, we do the step having fundamental conse-
quences for cognitive science. Assume that the mental behavior is determined
only by probabilities. Then different (stochastically equivalent) processes
x(t, ω), y(t, ω), . . . (which satisfy the same stochastic differential equation in
the mental space M with the same initial condition) induce the same mental
behavior (determined by the probabilities).
In our model (see section 6) elementary mental states are produced by
neural structures. In this model stochastic evolution of elementary mental
states implies the violation of the materialistic axiom of cognitive science. In
our model:
Different stochastic neural dynamics can produce the same mental behav-
ior.
It may be that the materialistic axiom is violated only for high level
mental functions which operate with probabilistic distributions produced by
neuronal ensembles.
This is our program of a mathematical mapping of mental processes
on mathematical spaces. It seems that precisely in this form the program
has never been formulated. Nevertheless, there were developed various ap-
proaches which realized some steps of this program (of course, the same step
can have a few different realizations depending on choices of mathematical
models for mental space and dynamical equations). We mention Dynamical
System Approach [14]-[19] which is based on the following principles:
(a) Embodiment of mind;
(b) Situatedness of cognition.
We recall that the orthodox Dynamical System Approach emphasizes
commonalties between behavior in neural and mental processes on one hand
and with physiological and environmental events on the other. The most
important commonality is the dimension of time shared by all these domains.
In fact, sharing of time scales with physical environment implies
(c) Continuous real time evolution described by differential equations.
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At the first step people working in the DS-approach decided to borrow the
model of space from physics. This was an attempt to embed mind into the
Euclidean physical space. This step (the special choice of space) determined
the following development of the DS-approach. At the second step there were
applied standard differential equations describing physical processes in the
brain as a physical system. In particular, there are widely applied oscillator
models.
We can also mention symbolic models [20], [21], and Neural Network Ap-
proach, [22]–[25]. In the opposition of the DS-approach, in the NN-approach
physical space does not play an important role. The fundamental role is
played by potentials xi(t) corresponding to neurons i = 1, ..., N. But this
using of physical potentials also implies application of the standard mathe-
matical models of physics. “Mental space” of the NN-approach – the space of
potentials – is also the real space which is the mathematical basis of physics.5
4 p-adic hierarchic mental space
In [1] there was proposed the p-adic model of mental space. We shall give
the detailed description of the p-adic mental space later and now we discuss
some general arguments in favor of this choice.
a.) Hierarchic structure of mental space. In neurophysiology and
psychology there is intensively discussed the idea that mental processes have
hierarchic structures. I would like to say that the mental image of the physical
world is a special hierarchic representation of this world. Thus a mental
space should be endowed with a hierarchic structure which would adequately
represent hierarchies observed in psychology and cognitive science. However,
the real continuum is totally homogeneous; there is no natural hierarchic
structure on the real continuous space. All physical points “have equal rights”
and translation as well as rotation invariance are the fundamental features
of all physical theories. This is one of reasons to reject the real continuous
model as a candidate to a model of mental space. On the other hand, the
p-adic space has a natural hierarchy which is induced by a tree structure of
this space.
b.) Tree structure, mental space as a product of neuronal ac-
tivity. It is clear that mental space should be coupled with the material
5We remark that in the NN-approach there were realized main steps of our program,
including stochastic neural models.
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structure of the brain. This structure should be represented in some way
in mental space.6 It is well known that many neuronal configurations in
the brain have the tree-structure. It seems to be natural to have such a
tree structure on mental space. And we remark that p-adic spaces have tree
structures, see Figure 1 - the tree representation of the 2-adic space.
♠⋆
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍❥
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟
✟✯
♠0 ❳❳❳❳❳❳③
✘✘
✘✘
✘✘✿
♠1 ❳❳❳❳❳❳③
✘✘
✘✘
✘✘✿
♠0
♠1
♠0
♠1
❳❳❳③
✘✘
✘✿
❳❳❳③
✘✘
✘✿
❳❳❳③
✘✘
✘✿
❳❳❳③
✘✘
✘✿
Figure 1: The 2-adic tree
For an arbitrary natural number p > 1, the p-adic tree is constructed in the
same way: there are p-branches leaving each vertex. In principle, we can
consider trees, where the number of branches depends on a vertex. However,
mathematics on such trees is essentially more complicated, cf. [1].
We now turn back to the story about the discovery of the cartesian system
of coordinates. Suppose for a moment that Descartes paid attention not to the
lattice on the window of his room, but to the internal hierarchic structure of the
tree: the root, the trunk, branches, subbranches, leaves. In such a case he would
6This statement is not about reductionism. We do not claim that mind can be directly
reduced to neuronal activity. As was mentioned, in our model the materialistic axiom
of cognitive science is violated. We just pay attention to the fact that physical neural
and mental structures should be coupled. We even need not stay on the materialistic
position. One could not totally exclude the possibility that material neuronal structures
are images of mental structures which are located in mental space. However, I would not
like to go deeply in such philosophic problems. This paper is simply an attempt to create a
mathematical model which contains new mental coordinates which differ essentially from
physical real coordinates.
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discover not the ordinary orthogonal system of coordinates, but a p-adic hierarchic
system on the tree.
c.) Absence of linear order in the space of mental states. As
we know, the real continuum is a linearly ordered set. Any set of points
x1, . . . , xm on the straight line can be ordered. On the other hand, there
are no reasons to assume that such an order structure can be introduced
on the space of mental states. It is impossible to order all minds, feelings,
emotions, ....; for example, it is very doubtful that it would be possible to
create a model of mental space such that for any two minds x and y it would
be possible to say x ≤ y or y ≤ x. Therefore the absence of a linear order on
a p-adic tree is an attractive feature of the p-adic model which can be useful
in mathematical modeling of mental processes.
(d.) Link to Aristotle, ultrametricity. As was already remarked,
Aristotle discussed in detail geometries of physical and mental spaces (for
him the latter was associated with the space of words), see [26]. Continu-
ity was considered as the main distinguishing feature of physical space. For
Aristotle the term continuity was related not to functions on some spaces (as
mathematicians do in the contemporary analysis), but to spaces by them-
selves. Aristotle’s notion of continuous space coincides with the notion of
connected space which is used in contemporary mathematics. A space is said
to be connected if it is impossible to split it into two parts in such a way that
there are no boundary points. Aristotle presented important arguments that
physical space is continuous-connected. At the same time he underlined that
mental space (space of words) is discontinuous (disconnected). Such a space
can be split into two parts without boundary points.
By using the contemporary terminology one can say that two thousands
years ago there was discussed the idea that mental spaces should be rep-
resented as disconnected mathematical spaces. The class of disconnected
topological spaces is well investigated, [27], [28]. We pay attention to the
important subclass of disconnected spaces – spaces which are endowed with
metrics. This is a purely mathematical restriction which essentially simpli-
fies modeling (but in principle there may exist natural mental applications
of non metrizable disconnected mental spaces). Under some mathematical
restrictions we get the class of so called ultrametric spaces. We recall that a
metric is called ultrametric if it satisfies the strong triangle inequality:
ρ(x, y) ≤ max[ρ(x, z), ρ(z, y)].
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The strong triangle inequality can be stated geometrically: each side of a tri-
angle is at most as long as the longest one of the two other sides. Finally, we
mention a theorem of general topology [28] which says that each ultramtric
space can be represented as a tree and vice versa. So we come to the tree
model of mental space which was developed in [1]-[10]. Such a model can be
considered as a modern version of the Aristotle’s model of mental space. I in-
terpret ultrametricity as the topological encoding of the hierarchic structure
of a tree. By operating in an ultrametric space we can forget about the under-
lying hierarchic structure and use the language of analysis: neighborhoods,
open and closed sets, convergence of sequences, continuity of functions (the
contemporary analysis gives the possibility to consider continuous functions
even on discontinuous spaces).7
(e.) p-adic trees and numbers. The class of general ultrametric
spaces is still too large for mathematical modeling (at least at the first stage
of realization of our program). In mathematical modeling of physics the
important role is played not only by continuity (topology) of the space, but
also by the presence of an algebraic structure on this space; elements of real
line can be interpreted as numbers (real numbers). We would like to have
such a structure on mental space. We need “mental numbers.” There is well
defined algebraic structure on a special class of trees, so called p-adic trees.
These are trees where p-branches leave each vertex and p is a prime number.
This number is an invariant of a tree and it does not depend on a vertex.
As was already remarked, on such a tree we can introduce the structure of a
field; if p is not a prime number, then the p-adic tree is only a ring, [1], [27],
[32], [33]. By using Figure 1 we can encode infinitely long branches of the
2-dic tree by strings of zeros and ones. Thus instead of branches of a tree
we can work with such strings. In the general case of a p-adic tree these are
strings of symbols belonging to the set {0, 1, ..., p−1}. The distance between
two strings x and y representing branches of the p-adic tree is defined as
ρp(x, y) =
1
pl(x,y)
,
where l(x, y) is the length of the common left-hand side part of strings x
and y. This is an ultrametric. So any p-adic tree is an ultrametic space. For
example, let p = 2 and let us consider strings x = (000...) and y = (001...).
7In many particular cases such a relation between ultrametricity and hierarchy was
used in theory of spin glasses, see, e.g., [29]-[31].
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Then l(x, y) = 2 and ρ2(x, y) = 1/4. Let z = (01...).Then l(x, z) = l(y, z) = 1
and hence ρ2(x, z) = ρ2(y, z) = 1/2 > 1/4 = ρ2(x, y).
The set of p-adic numbers is denoted by the symbol Qp. We choose Qp as
a mathematical model of mental space. In more general models we consider
mental spaces which have many p-adic coordinates: cartesian products of a
few p-adic trees; or even trees corresponding to different numbers p1, p2, ..., pn.
In our model p-adic numbers are considered as mental numbers. At the
moment we do not assign some special cognitive meaning to branches of p-
adic trees. There can proposed various models. In a series of papers [2], [5],
[6] we encoded psychological states by branches of p-adic trees. In this paper
we would like to find links to neurophysiology and associate mental strings
with activity of neurons, see section 6.
(f.) p-adic dynamical models for mental processes. We considered
discrete dynamical systems
xn+1 = f(xn), n = 0, 1, ...,
corresponding to maps f : Qp → Qp, x→ f(x). We use the standard termi-
nology of the theory of dynamical systems; see, for example, [1]. If f(a) = a
then a is a fixed point. If xn = x0 for some n = 1, 2, ... we say that x0 is a periodic
point. If n is the smallest natural number with this property then n is said to
be the period of x0. A fixed point a is called an attractor if there exists a neigh-
borhood (ball) V (a) of a such that all points x0 ∈ V (a) are attracted by a, i.e.,
limn→∞ xn = a.
In [1]-[8] there was proposed a dynamical model for the process of thinking
which is based on hierarchic coding of mental information by p-adic numbers
and processing by maps in p-adic trees. These are continuous maps with
respect to tree’s ultrametric. We recall that the tree-hierarchy is encoded
into the ultrametric topology. Thus such maps preserve hierarchic encoding
of information.
Another basic feature of our dynamical model [2] is that the process of
thinking is split into two separate (but at the same time closely connected)
domains: the conscious and the unconscious. We used the following point of
view of the simultaneous work of the consciousness and unconsciousness. The
consciousness contains a control center CC which has functions of control.
It formulates problems and sends them to the unconscious domain. The
process of finding a solution is hidden in the unconscious domain. In the
unconscious domain there works a gigantic dynamical system. Its work starts
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with a mental state x0 (or a group of mental states U0) which has been
communicated by the consciousness. Mathematically it corresponds to the
choice of an initial point x0 (or a neighborhood U0). Starting with this
initial point x0 a thinking processor f in the unconscious domain generates
at tremendous speed a huge number of new mental states:
x1 = f(x0), ...., xn+1 = f(xn), ...
These mental states are not used by the consciousness. The consciousness
(namely CC ) controls only some exceptional moments in the work of the
dynamical system in the unconscious domain. These are different regimes
of stabilization. First, there are attractors which are considered by the
consciousness as possible solutions of the problem. Then there are cycles
(a → b → · · · → c → a) which generate signals to stop the work of the dy-
namical system. If the consciousness cannot take a decision then it can send
a new initial mental state x′0 to the unconscious domain or change the regime
of work of a thinking processor in the unconscious domain. Mathematically
the change of a regime can be described as the change of a function f(x)
which determines the dynamical system. Thus we can describe the process
of thinking as the work of a family of dynamical systems fα(x), where the pa-
rameter α is controlled by the consciousness (or chance in random dynamical
thinking models, [6]). This model was used for modeling of psychological be-
havior. In particular, in [2] we simulated sexual behavior by encoding mental
states of sexual partners by hierarchic strings of information:
x=(sex, age, education level, ...)
The sexual dynamical system fsex operates with such hierarchical images
and produces “solutions” (or exhibit cyclic behavior).
The main problem of this model was impossibility to choose functions
f generating dynamics by using purely psychological reasons. We were able
only provide animation corresponding to simple functions on p-adic trees and
give psychological interpretation to results of such animation. Another rea-
son for looking for new models was that the above p-adic dynamical model
was purely deterministic. As was already mentioned, it seems to be more
natural to study models in which mental information is processed probabilis-
tically; models in which mental states are represented by fields of probability
on mental space and not by single points of this space. Finally, in [1]-[6] we
were not able to couple hierarchic p-adic encoding of information with neu-
rophysiology. In following sections we try to solve this problem of mind-body
relation and then proceed to probabilistic processing of mental information.
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5 Coupling of the p-adic mental space with
the neural structure
In previous sections there were presented some general arguments in favor
of the p-adic model of mental space. Now we present the neurophysiological
basis of the p-adic mental space. Coupling between the neuronal material
structures and the p-adic mental structures is based on the correspondence
between the neuronal hierarchy (i.e., hierarchic relations between neurons
and groups of neurons) and the p-adic tree hierarchy.
In our model each psychological function is based on a graph of neural
pathways, cognitive graph, that is centered with respect to one fixed neuron.
Thus basic units of processing of mental information are centered neural
pathways and basic units of mental information are centered strings of firings
produced by centered neural pathways.
S
Figure 2: Centered pathway
Centering determines a hierarchic structure on the cognitive graph and
on the corresponding space of mental points.
S
Figure 3: Cognitive graph
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A centering neuron S should not be considered as a kind of grandmother
neuron. It simply determines a system of mental coordinates (corresponding
to the concrete psychological function) on the neural system of a cognitive
system. Of course, such a model with one neuron centering of a psychological
function is oversimplified. Complex psychological functions should be based
on a few cognitive graphs centered with respect to an ensemble of neurons.
The centering hierarchic structure on a cognitive graph can be mapped on
the p-adic hierarchic structure with the aid of the frequency coding having
p as the base of coding, see section 6.3, 6.4. We call this approach Neural
Pathway Approach. The essence of this approach is the view to the p-adic
mental space as the product of hierarchically ordered neural activity and
frequency p-coding.
6 Model: thinking on a cognitive graph
6.1. Localization of psychological functions. One of the strong sides of
Neural Pathway Approach is a new viewpoint to the problem of localization
of psychological functions. Since an elementary unit of mental processing
is represented by a centered neural pathway and a pathway can go through
various domains of brain and body, there is no localization of mental func-
tions in the Euclidean geometry of the physical space that is typically used
to describe physical brain and body. On the other hand, a psychological
function can be localized in the space of all pathways. 8
We have to distinguish the space Π of all centered neural pathways (hier-
archic chains of neurons) in the physical brain and body and the space M of
all possible mental points that can be produced by elements of Π. In princi-
ple, a few distinct elements of Π, centered neural pathways, can produce (at
same instant of time) the same point x ∈M.
6.2. Body→mind field. Firings of neurons throughout centered neural
pathways of the cognitive graph produce elementary mental states (points)
8In fact, this is a kind of hierarchic localization, - compare to A. Damasio: “What
determines the contribution of a given brain unit to the operation of the system to which
it belongs is not just the structure of the unit but also its place in the system. ... The mind
results from the operation of each of the separate components, and from the concerted
operation of the multiple systems constituted by those separate components,” p. 15, [34].
In our model there is even no place for “separate components”; everything is unified from
the beginning due to the pathway representation of cognitive information.
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involved in the realization of a psychological function. We denote a psy-
chological function by the symbol f and the cognitive graph of the f by the
symbol Πf . How can we describe mathematically the functioning of f? There
are various levels of the mathematical description.
At the basic level we should provide the description of ‘body→mind’
correspondence. This correspondence is described by a function
ϕ : Πf →M,
that maps centered neural pathways into mental points produced by these
pathways: z ∈ Πf → x = ϕ(z) ∈M.We call the map ϕ(z) body→mind field.
9
The psychological function f generates the evolution of the field ϕ. Starting
with the initial field ϕ0(z), f produces time-dependent field ϕ(t, z). We have
to consider very important problem of interpreting of the evolution parame-
ter, ‘time’, t; in particular, relation between physical and psychological time.
We shall discuss this problem in section 9. At the moment we restrict ourself
to consideration of the discrete time evolution: t = tn = 0, 1, 2, . . . By taking
into account the process of wholeness of thinking we describe the functioning
of f by an integral operator with the kernel K(z, y) :
ϕ(tn+1, z) =
∫
Πf
K(z, y)ϕ(tn, y)dy, (7)
where integration is performed over the cognitive graph, Πf . We notice that
neither the space of pathways Πf nor the space of mental points M have the
Euclidean geometry. In particular, we cannot use the ordinary real analysis to
describe this model mathematically. We should use the so called ultrametric
analysis [1],[27], [32].10 Thus we propose the following model of thinking:
Each psychological function f is based on a graph of neural pathways,
cognitive graph Πf , see, e.g., Figure 2. The cognitive graph has the hier-
archic structure corresponding to the central neuron, S, of this graph. The
elementary unit of mental information – elementary mental state (or mental
point) – is given by the string of firings of neurons throughout a pathway, a
9Of course, φ depends on the psychological function f : φ = φf .
10The form of the kernel K(z, y) is determined by the psychological function f. We
notice that mental evolution (7) is represented by a linear integral operator in the space of
body→mind fields. In principle, we can consider more general, nonlinear models. However,
the model with summation over the whole graph with a weight function K(z, y) looks very
natural.
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branch of the graph. There can be proposed various neural pathway coding
systems based on strings of firings.
6.3. Firing/off (2-adic) coding. For each instant of time t, we assign
to a neuron in a pathway 1, if the neuron is firing, and 0, otherwise. Mathe-
matically a mental point is represented by a sequence of zeros and ones. Each
sequence is centered with respect to the position corresponding to firings of
the central neuron S.
Let us consider the geometric structure of the mental space M corre-
sponding to firing/off coding. Here each centered pathway produces a cen-
tered sequence of zeros and ones. The most important digit, x0 = 0 or 1, in
a sequence x ∈ M gives the state of the central neuron S. Hierarchy on the
mental space is based on the exceptional role that is played by the central
neuron. This hierarchy induces the 2-adic topology on the mental space.
In mathematical modeling it is convenient to consider infinitely long neu-
ral pathways and corresponding information strings, mental points (this is
of course just a mathematical idealization). In section 4 we introduced the
2-adic metric for mental points produced by cognitive graphs having only
output (with respect to the cental neuron S) neural pathways. Now we in-
troduce the 2-adic metric for mental points produced by general cognitive
graphs which contain input as well as output neural pathways. The 2-adic
distance ρ2 is defined in the following way. Consider two mental points:
x = (...x−l...x0...xk...) and y = (...y−l...y0...yk...), x±j , y±j = 0, 1.
We use index 0 for the state x0 of the central neuron S, negative indexes
for states of neurons that produce inputs propagating to the S through the
ordered neural chain, positive indexes – for states of neurons that are receivers
of S-output. First suppose that all input states coincide: all x−l = y−l. Let
l ≥ 0 be the first index such that xl 6= yl. Then by definition
ρ2(x, y) =
1
2l
. (8)
This is the distance considered in section 4. Thus if two neural pathways
z and w produce strings x and y having the same input part, then ρ2(x, y)
goes to zero if the length l of the common output part goes to infinity.
Suppose now that input parts are different. Let l be the first index (if we
go from the left hand side) such that x−l 6= y−l. Then by definition
ρ2(x, y) = 2
l. (9)
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Here larger common initial input part implies shorter distance between men-
tal points. Consider two neural pathways starting at e.g. a sensory receptor.
Suppose that states (e.g. on/off) of initial neurons in these pathways are
distinct. Then the distance between corresponding mental points is large.
It is important to remark that in such a situation longer pathways induce
larger distance between mental points, see also section 9.
We remark that a cognitive graph Πf producing the 2-adic mental space
need not have a tree-structure. Such a graph can contain numerous cycles.
However, the corresponding mental space M created by the 2-adic coding
always has the structure of the 2-adic tree.
6.4. Frequency (p-adic) coding. General p-adic coding (where p ≥ 2
is a natural number) may be induced by the frequency coding. We assign
to each neuron in a pathway the frequency of firings. Frequencies of firing
are a better basis for the description of processing of information by neurons
than a simple on/off. This has been shown to be the fundamental element of
neuronal communication in a huge number of experimental neurophysiologi-
cal studies (see e.g. [35], [36] on mathematical modeling of brain functioning
in the frequency domain approach). In the mathematical model it is conve-
nient to consider a discrete set of frequencies: 0, 1, .., p− 1, where p is some
natural number. Here frequency is the number of output spikes produced by
a neuron during some unit of psychological time (some period ∆ of physi-
cal time, see section 6 for detailed consideration). Thus mathematically a
mental point is represented by a sequence of numbers belonging to the set
{0, 1, . . . , p − 1}. Information is not homogeneously distributed throughout
such sequences. The presence of the central neuron S in the cognitive graph
Πf induces a hierarchic structure for elements of an information sequence.
This system of neural pathway frequency coding should be justified by
neurophysiological studies. However, at the moment there are no experimen-
tal technologies that would give the possibility to measure firings of neurons
throughout even one long pathway of individual neurons. To confirm our
pathway-coding hypothesis, we have to measure simultaneously firings of
neurons for a huge ensemble of neural pathways.
We underline that the system of coding and not the topological structure
of a cognitive graph determines the structure of the corresponding mental
space, see also section 9. Totally different cognitive graphs can produce the
same mental tree. For example, let us consider 2-adic coding. The graphs
a,b,c on Figure 4 produce the same, 2-adic, mental space.
In principle, we can consider our Neural Pathway Model an approximation
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S S S
Figure 4: Cognitive graphs: a,b,c
of TNGS-model, see Edelman [37] on Theory of Neural Groups Selection. To
combine TNGS with our model, we should consider hierarchic chains that
basis elements not singular neurons, but some groups of neurons). So it will
be Neuronal Group Pathway Model. In such a model we shall use natural
numbers xj = 0, 1, ..., p− 1, for coding of states of basic neuronal groups.
6.5. Main cognitive features of the model:
a). Nonlocality (with respect to Euclidean geometry) of psychological func-
tions.
b). Wholeness-integral evolution of body→mind field ϕ. 11
c). Sensation-thinking. Since neural pathways go through the whole body,
a part of a pathway involved in a high level psychological function can be
connected to e.g. skin-sensitivity. Thus high order psychological functions
also depend on various physiological stimuli.
d). Interrelation of distinct psychological functions. The central neuron
S of a cognitive graph plays the role of the center of the system of coordi-
nates. Other neurons can also be considered as such centers. Therefore the
same pathway contributes to distinct psychological functions. Thus evolution
of various psychological functions is simultaneous evolution based on huge
interrelation of corresponding cognitive graphs, see section 9.
e). Emotion based reasoning. Our pathway thinking model supports the
fundamental conjecture of A. Damasio, [34], that emotions play an important
role in the process of ‘reason-thinking’. Pathways going through centers
creating emotions can participate in psychological function of a high order
thinking process, e.g., proving mathematical theorems. On the other hand,
pathways going through reasoning-centers can go through some emotional
center. Thus reason participate in creation of emotions and vice versa.
11Compare to Bohmian-Hiley-Pilkka¨nen approach [11]-[13].
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7 Dynamics in the mental space.
7.1. Mental state. The body→mind field ϕ(z) describes important fea-
tures of functioning of the neural system (in particular, its part located in
brain). However, we will not be concentrated on the study of dynamics, e.g.
(7), of the body→mind field, since ϕ(z) describes the production of informa-
tion by the neural system (in particular, its part located in brain) and not
the flow of mental information by itself. I would like to formulate this as
Mental Thesis: The cognitive meaning of a mental point (with respect to
a psychological function f) does not depend on a neural pathway that produces
this mental point.
Mental activity is performed not in the pathway space, cognitive graph,
but in the mental space. Thus mental information does not remember its
neurophysiological origin. Mental Thesis is supported (at least indirectly) by
experimental evidences that functions of some damaged parts of brain can
be (in some cases) taken by other parts of brain, see e.g. [34], [38], [39]. This
thesis is also supported by neurophysiological evidences that very different
neural structures in brains of different species (e.g. fish and rat, [40]) can
fulfill the particular psychological function.12
Mental Thesis might be considered as a kind of anti-materialist thesis.
We would not like to be at such a position. We understand well that the
relation between the brain (in fact, in our pathway model - the whole body)
and mind plays the crucial role in mental activity. Mental Thesis should be
considered as directed against the individual deterministic relation between
functioning physical neural pathways in the body and cognitive meaning of
the corresponding mental points. The absence of such individual determinism
does not contradict to statistical determinism:
Thesis of Statistical Pathway Cognition. The cognitive meaning of a
mental point (with respect to a psychological function f) is determined by the
statistical probability of realization of this point in the ensemble of pathways
Πf (the cognitive graph corresponding to f).
Remark 7.1. (On the notion of probability) During many years I studied
foundations of probability theory, see [41]. I know well the large diversity of
12Of course, we should recall that by choosing the central neuron S we chose the concrete
psychological function f. Thus ‘the cognitive meaning’ is related to this concrete psycho-
logical function. By choosing another psychological function (a system of coordinates) we
get another cognitive meaning.
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viewpoints to the notion of probability. For me probability has nothing to do
with ‘potentiality’, ‘measure of belief’ and other perverse views. Probability is a
statistical measure. Let E be a large ensemble of, e.g., physical systems. Let these
physical systems have some states. These states are represented by points of the
state space. The probability of a state x with respect to the ensemble E is given
by the proportion:
p(x) =
the number of systems having the state x
the total number of elements in the ensemble
In our model physical systems are centered neural pathways; states are strings
of firings throughout pathways - mental points. An ensemble E is a cognitive
graph; the state space is the mental space. We suppose that the cognitive
meaning of a mental point x ∈M is determined by the quantity
p(x) =
the number of neural pathways that produce x
the total number of neural pathways in the cognitive graph
We call the p(x) (probabilistic) mental state. Here and in all following con-
siderations it is assumed that a psychological function f is fixed. In fact,
p(x) depends on f : p(x) = pf (x).
7.2. Mental evolution. Mental processes are probability-evolution
processes. These are evolutions of mental states. We have to find a mathe-
matical model that would provide the adequate description of the evolution:
t→ p(t, x). Consider a discrete dynamical system in the space of probability
distributions:
p(tn+1, x) = Lp(tn, x), (10)
where L is some operator in the space of probability distributions. The
generator of evolution L may be linear, may be nonlinear. There must be
performed experimental studies to find the form of L. Of course, L depends
essentially on a psychological function f and an individual.
Intuitively it is clear that there must be performed integration over the
whole mental space. The following evolution can be considered:
p(tn+1, x) =
∫
M
K(tn, x, y)p(tn, y)dy,
where K(t, x, y) is a time-dependent kernel of evolution. For p-adic mental
space M = Qp, dy is the Haar measure – an analogue of the ordinary linear
Lebesgue measure on the real line.
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The mental state p(t, x) is nothing else than the probability distribution
of the body→mind field ϕ(z). We can consider the cognitive graph Πf as a
probability space Ω ≡ Πf with the uniform probability measure
P(ω) =
1
number of elements in Ω
,
for ω ∈ Ω. Following to the probabilistic tradition we use the symbol ω
to denote a point of the probability space. The map (body→mind field)
ϕ : Ω→ M is a random variable and the mental state
p(x) = P(ω ∈ Ω : ϕ(ω) = x)
gives the probability that neural pathways in the cognitive graph represent
the mental point x. This is intensivity of neural representation of x.13
Thus the dynamics of the mental state, t→ p(t, x), can be considered as
the product of the dynamics of the corresponding stochastic process ϕ(t, ω),
the process of body→mind correspondence: P(t, U) = P(ω ∈ Ω : ϕ(t, x) ∈
U), where U is a domain in the Qp (or in the cartesian product of p-adic
fields). But(!) probability theory tells us that we could not reconstruct the
stochastic process φ(t, ω) as a point wise map in the unique way on the ba-
sis of corresponding probability distributions. Two stochastically equivalent
body→mind fields ϕ1(t, ω) and ϕ2(t, ω) produce the same dynamics of prob-
abilistic mental state p(t, x), cf. section 2. This argument gives the strong
support to our Mental Thesis. In our model there exists the body→mind
field φ(t, ω), but there is no mind→body field. This probabilistic considera-
tion can be used as the strong argument supporting nonreductionism: Neural
reduction of mental processes is impossible.
8 Diffusion model for dynamics of mental state
We now consider continuous time evolution for the simplest (from the math-
ematical viewpoint) body→mind fields – mental diffusion. 14
13According to Kolmogorov’s ideology [42] (that gives the basis of the modern probabil-
ity theory) the structure (e.g. topological) of a probability space (in our case a cognitive
graph Πf ) does not play any role in probabilistic formalism. Probabilistic formalism de-
pends only on the structure of the configuration space in that random variables take values.
In our case this is the p-adic mental space M = Qp.
14As we have already remarked, the ultrametic topology on the mental configuration
space and continuous real time dynamics are incompatible. However, we do not have such
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The evolution of the mental state p(t, x) is described by the forward
Kolmogorov equation (6), where L is a differential operator on the p-adic
space generating diffusion. Here the time t ∈ [0,+∞) is a real parameter and
the mental point x ∈ Qp is a p-adic parameter and the value p(t, x) ∈ [0, 1]
is also a real number.
Remark 4.1. (Determinism or free will?) Our mental model combines
determinism and free will. Mental determinism is a consequence of deterministic
evolution equations for probability distributions. However, this determinism is
determinism of probabilities. Thus probabilistic representation of the mental state
gives feeling of free will. We remark that the situation has some similarities with
quantum theory, see [43] and extended bibliography in this paper.
In the p-adic mental space M the simplest diffusion process is Vladimirov-
Volovich diffusion. This process was intensively studied in p-adic theoretical
physics, [33]. The corresponding evolution equation (p-adic heat equation) has
the form:
∂p
∂t
(t, x) = −
1
2
D2xp(t, x),p(0, x) = p0(x), (11)
where Dx is a kind of differential operator on the p-adic tree (Vladimirov’s op-
erator, [33]). We remark that (in the opposition of the ordinary real deriva-
tive) Vladimirov’s operator is nonlocal, i.e., Dxp(t, x) contains summation over
all points of the mental space. This feature of p-adic diffusion could be related to
wholeness of mental processes.
We can easily find the fundamental solution K(t, x). This is the solution for
the initial mental state p0(x) = δ(x). Here δ(x) is well known Dirac’s δ-function.
This is the probability distribution that is concentrated in the fixed mental point.
By knowing the dynamics, K(t, x), x ∈ M, of the mental state starting with the
‘sharp mental state’ δ(x) (all neural pathways of the whole mental graph produce
the same mental point)15. We can find the dynamics of the mental state p(t, x)
for any initial distribution p0(x) :
p(t, x) =
∫
M
K(t, x− y)p0(y)dy.
A more realistic model of mental evolution is based on the p-adic heat equation
with a mental potential V. Here V (x, y) can be chosen as e.g.
V (x, y) = ρp(x, y)
α, α ≥ 0,
where ρp(x, y) is the p-adic distance between mental points.
a problem with probabilistic dynamics. Here both time and probability distributions are
real valued continuous parameters.
15We understood that such a mental state might not be approached in reality. SoK(t, x)
is merely the ideal object used in the mathematical model.
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9 Discussion
9.1. Can be consciousness be treated as a variable? The first part of the
book [44] of B. J. Baars contains an interesting discussion on the possibility to treat
consciousness as a variable and the importance of such a treatment in cognitive
science. My attempt to quantify mental state was, in particular, motivated by this
discussion. However, we essentially modified Baars’ idea on mental-variable. As I
understood, his consciousness-variable would be a kind of Newtonian physical vari-
able such as position, velocity, force; see p. 11 [44] on similarity of consciousness-
variable to variables in Newtonian gravity. Our mental-variable, mental state, is a
probability distribution. Thus there are more similarities with statistical mechan-
ics and even with quantum mechanics. Such a variable is not a local variable on
brain. This is merely a wholeness variable, compare to [10]-[13].
Starting with a mental (probabilistic) state we can define a quantitative mea-
sure of consciousness, a kind of consciousness-variable. Of course, we understood
well that such a complex phenomenon as consciousness could not be completely
described by probability fields on mental space. Thus we just propose a mathe-
matical formalization of some features of consciousness. Maybe there can be found
many (may be infinitely many) other quantitative measures of various features of
consciousness.
First we discuss the connection between levels of neural activity and levels of
consciousness. The idea that there is the direct correspondence between levels of
neural activity and levels of consciousness is the very common postulate of cogni-
tive science. An extended discussion on this problem can be found, for example, in
[44], p.18-19. I disagree that there is such a direct relation between levels of neural
activity and levels of consciousness. For example, let us consider the extreme case
in that all possible states of brain are activated. Such a super-activation definitely
would not imply a high level of consciousness. It might be that not simply the
level of neural activity determines the level of consciousness.
Our conjecture is that one of quantitative measures of consciousness is de-
termined by the variation of a mental state (compare to [10]). One of possible
numerical measures of the level of consciousness is entropy of a mental state. It is
well known that (for the discrete probability distribution) entropy approaches the
maximal value for the uniform probability distribution. By our interpretation this
is the lowest level of consciousness (so it may be better to use entropy with minus
sign as a quantitative measure of consciousness).
Another possibility is to define a measure of consciousness as the variation of
a mental state (with respect to the p-adic metric on the mental space). This is a
natural quantitative measure of some features of consciousness, since the topologi-
cal structure of the mental space must be taken into account. The p-adic variation
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can be defined by using Vladimirov’s differential operator [33], Dx, on the p-adic
tree:
C(p) =
∫
M
|Dxp(x)|
2dx, (12)
where p(x) is the mental state of a cognitive system. C(p) is always nonnegative
and it takes its minimal value, C(p) = 0, for the uniform probability distribution.
At the moment we do not know anything about mental states having the C(p) of
the extremely high level, namely solutions of the problem: C(p)→ max.
9.2. Are animals conscious? Our model strongly supports the hypothesis
that animals are conscious (see e.g. [44] on the detailed neurophysiological and
behavioral analysis of this problem). If one of quantitative measures of conscious-
ness is really determined by the variation C(p) of the mental state, then animals
are definitely able to produce such nontrivial variations by their systems of neural
pathways. Moreover, in our Neural Pathway Model pathways going throughout
body play the important role in the creation of consciousness. Thus the role of
differences in brain structures should not be overestimated, compare with [44]. On
the other hand, animals have lower levels of C(p). We can quantify this problem
in the following way. There exists a threshold Chuman. Animals could not produce
mental states p(x) such that C(p) is larger than the human threshold Chuman. And
human beings (at least most of them) could produce (at least sometimes) mental
states for that C(p) is larger than this threshold.
9.3. Blindsight. Our model might be used to explain the mystery of blind-
sight and similar phenomena: “The mystery of blindsight is not so much that
unconscious visual knowledge remains. ...The greatest puzzle seems to be that
information that is not even represented in area V 1 is lost to consciousness when
V 1 is damaged.” - [44]. However, in our Neural Pathway Model by destruction
of some individual neurons (e.g. in area V 1) we destroy (modify) huge ensembles
of neural pathways. Of course, by our model information was never preserved in
area V 1 nor some other localized area. Information is preserved by ensembles of
pathways and they are not located in some particular domain of brain.
However, we also have to explain the unique function of area V 1 in creating
of visual consciousness: “V 1 is the only region whose loss abolishes our ability to
consciously see objects, events... But cells in V 1 respond only to a sort of pointillist
level of visual perception... Thus it seems that area V 1 is needed for such higher-
level experiences, even though it does not contain higher-level elements! It seems
like a paradox.” - [44]. Yes, area V 1 is the unique region that damage destroy our
ability to conscious visualization. But we recall that our model is, in fact, Centered
Neural Pathway Model. The uniqueness of area V 1 in conscious visualization is
determined by the fact that central neurons of cognitive graphs corresponding to
the psychological function of conscious visualization are located in area V 1.
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We continue citation of Baars [44]: “Cells that recognize objects, shapes, and
textures appear only in much “higher” regions of cortex, strung in a series of
specialized regions along the bottom of the temporal lobe.” Yes, these cells are
centers of cognitive graphs corresponding to other psychological functions, e.g.
object recognition.
9.4. Neural code and structure of mental space. Suppose that the
coding system of a cognitive system is based on a frequency code. There exists
a time interval ∆ (depending on a cognitive system and a psychological function)
such that a mental point produced by a centered neural pathway is a sequence with
coordinates given by numbers of oscillations for corresponding neurons during the
interval ∆. Thus in our model the problem of the neural code is closely related to
the problem of time-scaling in the neural system. For different ∆, we get different
coding systems, and, consequently, different structures of mental spaces. The
corresponding natural number p that determines the p-adic structure on the mental
space is defined as the maximal number of oscillations that could be performed
by neurons (in the cognitive graph for some fixed psychological function) for the
time interval ∆. The frequency coding is based on the 2-adic system induces the
2-adic mental space that differs crucially from the 5-adic (or 1997-adic) mental
space induced by the 5-adic (or 1997-adic) system. As it was demonstrated in [1],
by changing the p-adic structure we change crucially dynamics. Hence the right
choice of the time scaling parameter ∆ plays the important role in the creation of
an adequate mathematical model for functioning of a psychological function.
9.5. Psychological time. There might be some connection between the time
scale parameter ∆ of neural coding and psychological time. There are strong ex-
perimental evidences, see e.g. [45], that a moment in psychological time correlates
with ≈ 100 ms of physical time for neural activity. In such a model the basic
assumption is that the physical time required for the transmission of information
over synapses is somehow neglected in the psychological time. In the model, the
time (≈ 100 ms) required for the transmission of information from retina to the
inferiotemporal cortex (IT) through the primary visual cortex (V1) is mapped to
a moment of psychological time. It might be that by using ∆ ≈ 100 ms we shall
get the right p-adic structure of the mental space.
Unfortunately, it seems that the situation is essentially more complicated.
There are experimental evidences that the temporal structure of neural function-
ing is not homogeneous. The time required for completion of color information in
V4 (≈ 60 ms) is shorter that the time for the completion of shape analysis in IT
(≈ 100 ms). In particular it is predicted that there will be under certain condi-
tions a rivalry between color and form perception. This rivalry in time is one of
manifestations of complex level temporal structure of brain. It can be shown that
at any given moment in physical time, there are neural activities in various brain
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regions that correspond to a range of moments in psychological time. In turn, a
moment in psychological time is subserved by neural activities in different brain
regions at different physical times.
Therefore it is natural to suppose that different psychological functions have
different time scales and, consequently, different mental spaces. Thus one psycho-
logical function is based on the 2-adic mental space and another on the 5-adic (or
1999-adic) mental space. This is the very delicate point and we shall try to clarify
it.
There is the total space Π of all neural pathways. The concrete psychological
function f is based on some centered cognitive graph Πf (a subset of Π). There
exists the fixed time scale ∆ = ∆f corresponding to this psychological function.
Hence there exists the natural number p depending on ∆f (and hence on the f)
determining the p-adic structure of the mental space for the f. Thus p = pf . On
this pf -adic mental space there is defined the mental state pf (x) of the f. In general
another psychological function g has its own time scale ∆g and corresponding pg.
Its mental state pg(x) is well defined on the pg-adic space. If pf is not equal to
pg (e.g. pf = 2 and pg = 1997), then dynamics of mental states corresponding to
psychological functions f and g differs crucially – even if evolutions are described
by the same e.g. diffusion equation.
Finally, we remark that many psychological functions are strongly inter related
on the neural pathway level. Cognitive graphs Πf and Πg corresponding to psy-
chological functions f and g can have large intersection. In the extreme case these
graphs could even coincide: Πf = Πg. But the use of different time scales ∆f 6= ∆g
would produce totally different evolutions for corresponding mental states.
9.6. Discreteness of time. Previous considerations demonstrated that the
continuous real time model for the evolution of the mental state gives only rough
approximation to the really performed discrete time evolution. Moreover, dis-
cretization steps depend on corresponding psychological functions.
Thus the evolution of the mental state pf (t, x) of a psychological function f is
described by discrete time dynamics, where tn+1 = tn +∆.
9.7. What is about p-adic structures of our psychological functions?
If we accept Edelman’s Neural Darwinism [37], then we have to consider the possi-
bility that p-adic structures of our psychological functions can depend on individu-
als. Thus, for an individual I, the basis of his/her mental space for a psychological
function f depends both on f and I : p = pf,I . For two different individuals, for
example, Ivan and Andrei, the same psychological function f can be based on two
different mental spaces, MIvan and MAndrei, that are the pf,Ivan-adic tree and the
pf,Andrei-adic tree, respectively.
9.8. Does consciousness benefit from long neural pathways? Finally,
we discuss one of the greatest mysteries of neuroanatomy, see, for example, [34],
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[37]. It seems that in the process of neural evolution cognitive systems tried to
create for each psychological function as long neural pathways as possible. This
mystery might be explained on the basis of our neural pathway coding model. If
such a coding be really the case, then a cognitive system τ gets great benefits by
extending neural pathways for some psychological function as long as possible. For
example, let the neural code be based on p = 5 and let a psychological function f be
based on very short pathways of the length L = 2. Then the corresponding mental
space contains N(5, 2) = 25 = 32 points. Let now p = 5 and L = 10000. Then the
corresponding mental space contains huge number of points N(5, 10000) = 1020
points. On the latter (huge) mental space there can be realized mental states
having essentially more complex behavior (and, consequently, higher magnitude
of consciousness). This ‘mental space extending’ argument can be used to explain
spatial separation of various maps in brain, see e.g. Edelman [37].
9.9. Why activity of “far away” neurons play important role? Con-
sider a psychological function based on a cognitive graph with one central neuron S.
Suppose that interaction between mental points (produced by the graph) depends
on the p-adic distance between these points, e.g.
V (x, y) = ρp(x, y)
α, α > 0.
Then changes of states of input neurons that are located far away from the central
neuron S (on neural pathways belonging to the cognitive graph) play the crucial
role in variation of the magnitude of the mental potential V (x, y). If states (e.g.
rates of firing) of initial input neurons are different, then ρp(x, y) is very large, see
(9).
10 Postulates
Our mathematical model of probabilistic thinking on p-adic mental spaces16 is
based on following four postulates:
1. Pr : Mental states are determined by probability distributions on mental
spaces.
Evolution of mental states is described by classical (or may be even quantum)
evolution equations for probability distributions of random processes, e.g. diffusion
equations, on ultrametric p-adic mental spaces.
2. NeurPath: ‘Quant’ of mental information (point of mental space) is given
by the state of a hierarchic neural pathway.
16Such spaces are produced by cognitive graphs of hierarchic neural pathways.
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NeurGr: Each psychological function is based on a hierarchic graph of neural
pathways, cognitive graph.
3. Ult: Mental topology is ultrametric.
It is supposed that mental spaces (in the opposite to spaces used in physical
models) have ultrametric topology. The presence of such geometry is equivalent
to a treelike representation of mental space.
4. FrCod: Mental encoding of information is performed by accounting fre-
quencies of firings of neurons throughout hierarchic neural pathways.
This encoding of information determines the natural number p (depending on
a psychological function and a cognitive system).
The first postulate, Pr, determines the (probabilistic) structure of high level
information processing in cognitive systems. Other postulates are related to pro-
cessing of cognitive information on the primary level. In fact, Pr need not be
rigidly connected with further postulates. There can be developed other cognitive
models of probabilistic thinking. In particular, we need not base all models on the
last postulate FrCod. There can be other models of mental coding.
Finally, we briefly discuss relation of our Probabilistic Neural Pathway Model
to some traditional models of cognition. As was already remarked, we do not
study neural dynamics in the physical brain. Our model is purely information
model. We study flows of specially organized information. Postulates NeurPath
and FrCod provide connection with neurophysiology. However, we are not in-
terested in investigation of functioning of neural networks producing hierarchic
strings of information, mental points. The only important thing is the form of
probability distribution (mental state) on the space of mental points. As it was
already underlined, different dynamical processes on neural level can produce the
same probability distribution.
In principle, there can exist some model, for example, connectionist (neural
network) model, that would describe “production” of information strings forming
a mental state. However, such a generalized connectionist model should be based
on new paradigm: hierarchic neural pathway as basis processing unit (not single
neuron!). We even can not exclude the possibility that such an “underground
model” could be some AI-model. Our experience of computer simulations shows
that very complex random behaviour can be algorithmically simulated. But, in
principle, we need not presuppose existence of any deterministic “underground
model”.
I also would like to point to some connection with distributed representation
models. We recall that A distributed representation is one in which meaning is not
captured by a single symbolic unit, but rather arises from the interaction of a set of
units, normally a network of some sort . If we use just the first part of this definition
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(i.e., omit relation to neural networks), then we could consider Probabilistic Neural
Pathway Model as a kind of model of distributed representation: mental units
(points) are unified through probability distribution – mental state.
I would like to thank all people (neurophysiologists, physicists, philosophers,
psychologists, mathematicians, parapsychologists) with whom I discussed (at var-
ious occasions) different aspects of my model. I am especially grateful to D. Amit,
B. Hiley, S. Greenfield, G. Parisi, P. Pilkka¨nen, A. Plotnitsky, G. Vitiello and all
participants of seminars at University of Rome (“La Sapineza”, Dept. of Psychol-
ogy), Moscow State University (the Chair of High Neural Activity) and Institute of
High Neural Activity and Neurophysiology of Russian Academy of Science devoted
to presentations and discussions of my p-adic model.
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